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NOTES 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: 
Preserving the Traditional Copyright 
Balance 
Christine Jeanneret* 
INTRODUCTION 
Technological developments have routinely been regarded warily 
by the entertainment industries because of the increased risk of 
piracy perceived as accompanying such developments.1  Jack 
Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(hereinafter MPAA), perhaps best illustrated this point with his 
comment before the House Judiciary Committee in 1982.2  Valenti 
stated that the videocassette recorder is to the American film 
producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the 
woman alone.3 
Of course, as noted in the New York Times, the woman in this 
instance survived, and even flourished.4  The VCR did not spell 
doom for the film studios; rather, it provided the film industry with a 
new market to exploit through videotape sales and rentals.5 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., cum laude, Barnard 
College, 1996.  I would like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his insights and guidance 
in writing this Note, and the editors and staff of the IPLJ for their edits.  Special thanks to 
my friends, and of course, to Marc and Sharon Jeanneret for all of their invaluable support. 
 1 See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(discussing the advent of the video cassette recorder and the effects the new technology 
would have on copyright owners); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908) (discussing ramifications of the introduction of the player piano). 
 2 Adam Liptak, Is Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2000, at B9. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. 
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Despite this success, the potential opportunities created by new 
technological innovations are invariably met by the copyright 
owners instinctual fear of infringement.6  This pervasive fear has 
resurfaced once again with the advent of digital technology.7  But is 
the fear again unfounded?  Digital technology arguably introduces 
new and unprecedented threats of piracy.8  Digitally stored works 
can be repeatedly reproduced with each copy retaining near perfect 
quality.9  The Internet provides an instantly accessible and vast 
global audience for digitally pirated works.10  Furthermore, 
advancements in file compression programs guarantee faster and 
easier transmission of digital works in the future.11  The analog world 
presents no such dangers.12 
In response to the unique aspects of the digital environment, 
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(hereinafter DMCA).13  Indeed, the DMCA was designed to make 
 
 6 See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417; White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1 (illustrating how these 
fears have led to litigation). 
 7 See infra note 8. 
 8 See Intellectual Property Rights: The Music and the Film Industry: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Intl Economic Policy and Trade of the House Intl Relations Comm., 
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter Lehman Statement] ([a]dvances in 
digital technology and the rapid development of electronic networks and other 
communications technologies raise the stakes much higher.  Any two-dimensional work can 
be digitized . . . [t]he work can then be stored and used in that digital format. This 
dramatically increases: the ease and speed with which it can be copied; the quality of copies 
(both the first and the hundredth); the ability to manipulate and change the work; and the 
speed with which copies of itboth authorized and unauthorizedcan be delivered to the 
public.). 
 9 Id. 
 10 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 53-54 n.80 (2000) (describing 
characteristics of digital technology such as ease of transmission and multiple use, which 
allows a single pirate copy to be hooked up to a network of computers or a network of 
users . . . each of whom can have ready and virtually simultaneous use of the same copy 
(citing Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property 
Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323 (1990))). 
 11 See id. (By comparison with books and other traditional media, works in digital 
media do not take up much space. . . .  The compactness of digital data will . . . allow new 
assemblages of materials that in a print world would be unthinkable.). 
 12 See supra notes 7-10; see infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 13 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998)). 
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digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted 
materials.14  In order to accomplish its stated goal, the DMCA 
incorporated provisions to provide . . .protection against 
circumvention of technological measures used by copyright owners 
to protect their works.15  Thus, the DMCA prohibits circumventing 
technological measures in order to merely access, not just copy, 
digital copyrighted works.16 
Because the DMCA limits access in this way, it has been criticized 
as unjustly expanding the monopoly of copyright owners and the 
control they can exert over their work.17  Generally, the rights of the 
copyright owner include control over the reproduction, distribution, 
performance and display of the copyrighted work.18  In barring 
access, Congress has been criticized as having, in practical terms, 
extended copyright law to also cover use, an area historically 
considered beyond the scope of the copyright owners authority.19  
Likewise, critics have argued that by prohibiting technological 
circumvention to access a digital work, Congress has effectively 
extinguished the defense of fair use.20 
This Note takes the position that the anti-circumvention provisions 
were a necessary response to the unique threats posed by digital 
innovations.  Moreover, these provisions were necessary to maintain 
an equitable balance between the rights of copyright owners and the 
rights  of  consumers.   The  realities  of  file  sharing  and  the recent,  
 
 14 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998), as quoted in David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 681 (2000). 
 15 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, 
Dec. 1998, at 3 [hereinafter SUMMARY]. 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 17 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between 
access and use in digital environment and perceived threat of a pay per view world). 
 18 See infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive rights granted to 
copyright owner). 
 19 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the Digital Millennium, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 143 (1999). 
 20 See generally infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
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well-publicized flurry of litigation concerning this issue21 only 
underscore the necessity of the new legislation. 
Part I of this Note will provide a legal background for the 
copyright issues explored by discussing the general rights of the 
copyright ownerand the limits on these rightsprimarily through 
the concept of fair use.  In addition, Part I introduces the relevant 
provisions of the DMCA in more detail.  Part II examines both sides 
of the conflict surrounding the anti-circumvention provisions by 
exploring both the congressional and scholarly debate regarding its 
enactment, and by examining the case Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes.22  Part III argues that the threats of a pay-per-use 
world23 are largely speculative, and that extending the concept of fair 
use beyond the statutory exceptions would defeat the purpose of the 
DMCA protections and render them useless. 
 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Copyright Act of 1976 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.24  To this end, Section 106 of 
 
 21 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(holding balance of harms supported grant of preliminary injunction in music industry 
plaintiffs copyright infringement action against Internet start-up which allowed users to 
download MP3 music files due to evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and 
uploading of plaintiffs copyrighted works); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding defendants links to 
websites providing formulae to de-encrypt plaintiff film industrys DVDs constituted 
violation of DCMA and warranted granting of preliminary injunction). 
 22 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
 23 See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 710-39 (2000) (discussing threat of pay-per-use worldin which one 
would always need to pay for access in an exclusively digital environment). 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the Act)25 provides the 
copyright owner with the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
the reproduction, distribution, and performance or display of the 
copyrighted work. 26 
Providing the copyright owner with these exclusive rights benefits 
both the owner and the general public because [p]rotection of works 
of authorship provides the stimulus for creativity, thus leading to the 
availability of works of literature, culture, art and entertainment that 
the public desires.27  Therefore, [i]f these works are not protected, 
then the marketplace will not support their creation and 
dissemination, and the public will not receive the benefit of their 
existence.28 
However, the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are still 
subject to certain exceptions,29 including, notably, the defense of fair 
use.30  Fair use encompasses use for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.31  
The defense permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of 
the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.32 
Section 107 of the Act delineates four non-exclusive factors to 
consider in determining whether a use is fair.  The factors to be 
evaluated include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
 25 See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803). 
 26 Id. § 106. 
 27 Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Report of the Working Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure: The White Paper (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter White Paper], reprinted in CRAIG 
JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (5th ed. Supp. 2000) at 748. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. at 759 n.559 (stating that the exclusive right is subject to § 108). 
 30 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.33 
It is well established that these factors must be weighed together 
and applied judicially on a case-by-case basis.34  No single factor is 
determinative.35  However, the Supreme Court, in Campbell, 
indicated that the fourth factorthe effect upon the potential 
marketis the most influential.36 
B.  Background to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The purpose of the DMCA was to bring U.S. copyright law 
squarely into the digital age.37  The world was making a steady 
transition from an analog to a digital environment due largely to the 
rapid growth and use of computer technologyin particular 
digitization.38  Coupled with the advances in communications 
technology resulting from the development of the fiber optic cable, 
the new information infrastructure promised that separate 
communications  networks  would   be   integrate[d] . . . into an 
advanced high-speed, interactive, broadband, digital communications 
system.39 
New methods for reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted 
works followed the shift to a digitally based economy.40  With these 
new methods and opportunities came new risks.41  As noted in the 
Clinton Administrations White Paper on Intellectual Property: 
 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 34 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 35 See id. at 578. 
 36 See id at 590. 
 37 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998), as quoted in Nimmer, supra note 23, at 680 (2000). 
 38 See White Paper, supra note 27, at 744. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. (discussing what these new methods are). 
 41 See generally supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (illustrating how technological 
developments can lead to increased risks). 
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[T]he NII [National Information Infrastructure] can  
provide benefits to authors and consumers by reducing the 
time between creation and dissemination . . . [however] 
[j]ust one unauthorized uploading of a work onto a 
bulletin board, for instanceunlike, perhaps, most single 
reproductions and distributions in the analog or print 
environment could have devastating effects on the market 
for the work.42 
The DMCA was enacted to help eliminate these new risks posed 
by the digital environment.43  Indeed, the DMCA was considered a 
necessary measure to ensure that copyright owners would take 
advantage of the new technology and disseminate their works to the 
public without having to fear the increased risks of digital piracy.44 
C.  The DMCA and the Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
A key part of realizing the goals necessary to make the digital 
world safe for copyright owners came in the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA.45  These provisions came as a response to 
both the digital age and the international norms set forth in the World 
International Property Organization (hereinafter WIPO) treaty.46 
The Clinton Administration viewed the implementation of the new 
legislation as necessary in bringing the U.S. into compliance with the 
WIPO treatys anti-circumvention norm.47  The WIPO treatys anti-
circumvention clause states: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors 
 
 42 See White Paper supra note 27, at 745-46. 
 43 See Lehman Statement, supra note 8. 
 44 See Lehman Statement, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the increased 
risks of piracy associated with the digital format). 
 45 See infra notes 53-55 (setting forth the § 1201 anti-circumvention provisions). 
 46 See Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1717-18 (1999). 
 47 See id. 
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in connection with the exercise of their rights . . . and that 
restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not 
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law.48 
It becomes evident, upon examining the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA, that the language of the WIPO treaty 
provision is clearly broader and more general than that used in its 
U.S. domestic counterpart. 49 
In enacting the DMCA, Congress heeded the advice set forth in the 
Administrations White Paper, which stated that technological 
protection likely will not be effective unless the law also provides 
some protection for the technological processes and systems used to 
prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works.50  To 
this end, the White Paper recommended that a chapter be included in 
the DMCA that would specify the prohibition of: 
the importation, manufacture or distribution of any device, 
product or component incorporated into a device or 
product, or the provision of any service, the primary 
purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without authority of 
the copyright owner or the law, any process, treatment, 
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the 
violation of any of the exclusive rights under Section 
106.51 
The White Papers recommendation was realized in the enactment of 
§ 1201.52 
Section 1201 broke the anti-circumvention violations down into 
three different types of violations: a basic provision,53 a ban on 
 
 48 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 11, 36 
I.L.M. 65, 71. 
 49 See supra note 48; see infra notes 53-55. 
 50 White Paper, supra note 27, at 744. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
 53 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (No person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
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trafficking,54 and additional violations.55  The basic provision bars an 
individual from circumventing a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a copyrighted work.56  Circumventing 
a technological work is defined in the DMCA as encompassing 
actions as varied as de-scrambling, decrypting, or otherwise 
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or impairing a 
technological measure, without authorization from the copyright 
owner, to gain access to the protected work.57 
Section 1201 further defines a technological measure which 
effectively controls access to a work as a measure which requires the 
application of certain information, or a process or treatment, with the 
authority of the copyright owner, in order to gain access to the 
work.58 
Both the ban on trafficking and the additional violations provision 
of § 1201 begin by providing that: [n]o person shall manufacture, 
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any 
 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.). 
 54 Id. § 1201(a)(2) (No person shall manufacturer, import, offer to the public, provide, 
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or 
(C) Is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that 
persons knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under this title.). 
 55 Id. § 1201(b)(1) (No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, 
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that  (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection 
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner 
under this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only limited commercially significant 
purpose or use other than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that 
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion 
thereof; or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with 
that persons knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological 
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a 
portion thereof.). 
 56 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 57 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
 58 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). 
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technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof59 
that falls into one of three main categories: (1) is primarily designed 
or produced to circumvent; (2) has only limited commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent; (3) is marketed 
for use in circumventing.60 
The difference between the ban on trafficking and the additional 
violations provision is that the ban on trafficking applies to 
circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a 
work,61 while the additional violations provision applies to 
circumventing protection of a technological measure that protects a 
right of a copyright owner.62  Namely, § 1201 divides technological 
measures into two categories: those that bar unauthorized access to 
a copyright-protected work and those that bar unauthorized copying 
of a protected work.63 
Moreover, as noted by Nimmer, the additional violations appear 
in their own statutory paragraph [§ 1201(b)], separate from the 
preceding paragraph of section 1201[(a)] that contains both the basic 
provision and the ban on trafficking . . . [a]ccordingly, there is a 
marked contrast between the two schemes.64  As Nimmer set forth: 
As to prohibited access, the person engaging in that 
conduct has violated the basic provision; anyone assisting 
her through publicly offering services, products, 
devices . . . to achieve the prohibited technological breach 
is separately culpable under the ban on trafficking.  By 
contrast, a person who engaged in prohibited usage of a 
work to which he has lawful access does not run afoul of 
any provision of section 1201.  It is only someone who 
assists  him  through  publicly offering services,  products,  
 
 59 Id. § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1). 
 60 SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4. 
 61 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
 62 Id. § 1201(b). 
 63 SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4. 
 64 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 689. 
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devices, etc., to achieve the prohibited technological 
breach who becomes culpable under the additional 
violations.65 
The Copyright Office contends that this distinction was employed 
to assure the public will have the continued ability to make fair use 
of copyrighted works.66  However, the question remains how one 
could make fair use of a work when it is illegal to gain access to it. 
D.  Statutory Exceptions within Section 1201 
The anti-circumvention provisions are subject to an ongoing 
administrative rule-making process67 to determine whether the 
impact of the anti-circumvention provisions is adversely affecting 
individuals seeking to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted 
works.68  Moreover, section § 1201 is subject to a number of listed 
exceptions.69  Perhaps the most significant with regard to fair use is 
section § 1201(d), which provides an exemption for the nonprofit 
library, archive and educational institution, establishing the so-called 
shopping right.70  The shopping right permits such nonprofit and 
 
 65 Id. at 689-90. 
 66 SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4. 
 67 Id. at 5 ([P]eriodic rulemaking by the Librarian of Congress, on the recommendation 
of the Register of Copyrights, who is to consult with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
for Communications and Information.); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (The factors to be 
considered in determining the adverse effect of § 1201 include the following: (i) the 
availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit 
archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the 
circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of 
circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; 
and (v) such other factors as the Librarian [of Congress] deems appropriate.). 
 68 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).  See also supra note 67 and accompanying text 
(describing factors involved in making a determination of whether there has been an adverse 
effect). 
 69 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j). 
 70 Id. § 1201(d) (Exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational 
institutions.  (1) A nonprofit, library, archives, or educational institution which gains 
access to a commercially exploited copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith 
determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work for the sole purpose of engaging in 
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educational or archival institutions to circumvent solely for the 
purpose of making a good-faith determination regarding whether 
they wish to obtain authorized access to the work.71  However, this 
exemption exists only when an identical copy of that work is not 
reasonably available in another form.72  Other important exemptions 
listed in § 1201 include reverse engineering to achieve 
interoperability,73 encryption research,74 protecting personal 
privacy,75 and security testing.76 
In addition, § 1201 includes a general savings clause which 
provides that [n]othing in this section should affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, 
under this title.77  However, it is important to interpret the anti-
circumvention provisions in § 1201 as constituting a violation 
separate and distinct from copyright infringement.78  Thus, fair use, 
the traditional defense to copyright infringement, does not apply to 
technological circumvention.79  Indeed, a violation of the anti-
 
conduct permitted under this title shall not be in violation of subsection (a)(1)(A).). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. § 1201(d)(2). 
 73 Id. § 1201(f) (exception which permits circumvention by a person who has lawfully 
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole 
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to 
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs. . . .). 
 74 Id. § 1201(g) (permits circumvention of access control measures  to identify flaws in 
encryption technologies). 
 75 Id. § 1201(i) (permits circumvention when the technological measure, or the work it 
protects, is capable of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information about 
the online activities of a person). 
 76 Id. § 1201(j) (permits circumvention for the purpose of testing the security of a 
computer system or network). 
 77 Id. § 1201(c)(1). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (statement of Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyrights, discussing the 
inapplicability of fair use to the act of circumvention) [hereinafter Peters Statement]; see 
also id. ([T]he [savings] clause does not establish fair use as a defense to the violation of 
section 1201 in itself . . . the fair use provision in section 107 by its terms applies only to 
infringement of copyright rights.). 
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circumvention provisions is deemed a violation regardless of whether 
it even results in infringement.80 
II.  FAIR USE: STRIKING A BALANCE WITH THE DMCA 
This part presents the arguments set forth by critics of the DMCA, 
as well as the arguments made in favor of the perceived greater 
protection afforded by the DMCA.81  In addition, this section will 
examine how the Southern District of New York interpreted § 1201 
in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.82 
A. Section 1201 as an Improper Expansion of the Copyright 
Monopoly 
1.  Section 1201 is Unnecessarily Broad 
In enacting the DMCA, Congress is charged with pandering to 
Hollywood and the demands of the copyright industry giants.83  The 
stated goals of the DMCA, namely, to bring the U.S. into compliance 
with the WIPO treaty and to bring U.S. copyright law squarely into 
the digital age,84 arguably did not require measures as stringent as 
those reflected in the DMCAs anti-circumvention provisions.85  The 
anti-circumvention provisions drafted into the DMCA certainly 
 
 80 See id. 
 81 See infra Part II.A-B. 
 82 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 83 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 523 (1999) 
([B]y colorful use of high rhetoric and forceful lobbying, Hollywood and its allies were 
successful in persuading Congress to adopt the broad anti-circumvention legislation they 
favored. . . .). 
 84 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
 85 See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 563 (arguing that the stringent measures seen in 
section 1201 comes as the result of bad judgment on the part of the Clinton Administration 
and not from any flaws in the WIPO Treaty, Samuelson maintains that the diplomatic 
conference had the good sense to adopt only a general norm on circumvention, leaving 
nations free to implement this norm in their own way.); see also supra note 48 and 
accompanying text (setting forth the corresponding WIPO provision). 
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exceeded the corresponding provision in the WIPO treaty.86  In fact, 
according to Secretary William Daley of the Department of 
Commerce, [F]or the most part the [WIPO] treaties largely 
incorporate intellectual property norms that are already part of U.S. 
law.87  Indeed, [t]he U.S. could have pointed to a number of 
statutes and judicial decisions that establish anti-circumvention 
norms.88  In addition, [w]ith U.S. copyright industries thriving in 
the current legal environment, it would have been fair to conclude 
that copyright owners were adequately protected by the law.89 
The copyright industries, however, demanded that the DMCA 
provide them with stronger protection,90 a request that was 
considered premature by some critics.91  Even if new legislation was 
in fact necessary, Pamela Samuelson argues that the anti-
circumvention provisions that were enacted go far beyond what was 
required to make the world safe for copyrighted works in the digital 
era: the Administration might have . . . proposed to make it illegal 
to circumvent a technical protection system for purposes of engaging 
in or enabling copyright infringement.  This, after all, was the danger  
 
 86 See The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and The World 
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Hearings on 
H.R. 2180 and 2281 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement from the Digital Future Coalition arguing that [i]t is . . . the opinion of many 
experts that enactment of adequate and effective measures against special purpose black 
boxes would, in itself, be sufficient to satisfy a contracting nations obligations in this 
regard.). 
 87 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 6 (1998). 
 88 Samuelson, supra note 83, at 532. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, 
extolling the virtues of the copyright industries and their importance to the national 
economy in producing more than $50 billion of revenue abroad, providing roughly four 
percent of the GDP, and employing people at twice the rate of the national average). 
 91 See Intellectual Property: Hearings on H.R. 2281 Before the Telecommunications, 
Trade and Consumer Protection Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (statement of Hilary Rosen, President and C.E.O., the Recording Industry 
Association of America) [hereinafter Rosen Statement]. 
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that was said to give rise to the call for anti-circumvention 
regulations in the first place.92 
In contrast, the DMCA makes it illegal not just to infringe upon a 
copyrighted work, but also to circumvent a technological measure in 
order to gain access.93  In fact, the device or service which 
circumvents the measure need not be designed or produced to do 
so.94  The DMCA prohibits any device that has only limited 
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent.95  
A potential plaintiff need only demonstrate that the device is capable 
of circumvention; hence, there is no need to prove even one instance 
of actual infringement.96  The legislation is thus regarded as extreme 
because it punishes the circumvention devices themselves, rather 
than the individual bad acts.97 
B. Section 1201 Contradicts the Sony Decision and Extinguishes 
Fair Use 
Opponents of § 1201 have further questioned how the DMCA 
squares with the seminal decision regarding fair use reached in Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios.98  In Sony, the Supreme Court 
explored the effect of home videotape recorders on the rights of 
copyright owners.99  Respondents (copyright owners) filed suit 
against petitioners (VCR manufacturers) alleging that some 
individuals had used petitioners VCRs to record respondents 
copyrighted programs which had been exhibited on commercially 
sponsored television.100  As a result, respondents asserted that their 
 
 92 Samuelson, supra note 83, at 533. 
 93 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
 94 Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 556 ([t]his creates a potential for strike suits by 
nervous or opportunistic copyright owners who might challenge (or threaten to challenge) 
the deployment of a new information technology tool whose capabilities may include 
circumvention of some technical protection system . . . [t]he mere potentiality for 
infringement will suffice to confer rich rewards on a successful plaintiff.). 
 97 See id. 
 98 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
 99 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-34 (1984). 
 100 Id. at 419-20 (respondents own copyrights on some television programs broadcast on 
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copyrights had been infringed.101  Respondents further asserted that 
by marketing the VCRs to the public, petitioners were liable for the 
alleged infringement.102 
In its 5-4 decision103 the Court ultimately held that time-shifting, 
defined as the recording of a television broadcast to be watched at a 
later time, constituted a substantial non-infringing use, and was 
therefore a fair use.104  In the opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, 
the Court held that the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of 
other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.105  The Court found that one 
potential use of the VCRprivate, noncommercial time-shifting in 
the homesatisfied the substantial non-infringing use standard.106 
In order to challenge such a noncommercial use, the Court stated 
that the respondent must prove either that such a use would be 
harmful or that if the noncommercial use were to become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.107  The Court supported the District Courts 
finding that there was no basis to the assumption that live television 
audiences would decrease as a result of Betamax tapes.108  Moreover, 
the Court observed that respondents might in fact benefit from the 
publics use of Betamax since it might allow more people to actually 
view their broadcasts.109  Thus the Court dismissed respondents 
claim that time-shifting presented any likelihood of harm to the value 
of their copyrighted works.110 
 
public airwaves). 
 101 Id. at 420. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 457 (Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall, 
Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined). 
 104 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
 105 Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
 106 See id. 
 107 Id. at 451. 
 108 See id. at 452-55. 
 109 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. 
 110 See id. at 456. 
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The Court further noted that copyright protection has never 
accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses 
of his work.111  Individual consumers still retain the ability to 
reproduce a copyrighted work in order to make a fair use.112 
The relevance of the decision in Sony was questioned during 
congressional hearings on the DMCA.113  Gary Shapiro, President of 
Consumer Electronic Manufacturers, argued that [p]roponents of 
section 1201 should simply admit that it nullifies the [Sony] Betamax 
holding: 
[N]ow, section 1201(b) would ban [the VCR], upon a 
finding that it, or any component or part, is designed, used 
or marketed for the purpose of failing to respond to any 
so-called technical protection measure.114   
In short, under § 1201, the VCR would be considered a 
circumvention device which should be banned from being sold 
despite the fact that it also provides a legitimate non-infringing 
use.115  When before the House Judiciary Committee, the Digital 
Future Coalition echoed the same concern: 
[S]pecifically, we have argued that to preserve the 
availability of multi-purpose consumer electronic devices 
(such as VCRs and PCs) it is essential that prohibitions 
on technology contained in any new digital intellectual 
property legislation should be limited to those devices 
which are specifically designed or marketed to defeat 
owners efforts at technology self-help.  The over breadth 
of the technology regulations contained in digital 
 
 111 See id. at 432-33. 
 112 See id. at 433. 
 113 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 114 See The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (statement of Gary Shapiro, President of Consumer Electronic Manufacturers) 
[hereinafter Shapiro Statement]. 
 115 See id. 
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copyright bills introduced in the 104th Congress, prior to 
the conclusion of the WIPO treaties, was a principle basis 
of DFCs [Digital Future Coalitions] opposition to those 
proposals.116 
Thus, the broadness of the anti-circumvention provisions may limit 
the ability of technology companies to create innovative devices, 
and, to some degree, will allow the copyright industries to control the 
design and manufacture of all information technologies that can 
process digital information.117 
Concerns about the broad language used in the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA are not limited to members of the 
technology community.118  An individual creating a circumvention 
device solely for the purpose of acquiring access to make a fair use 
of a digital worke.g., helping a library circumvent a technological 
measure to make use of its shopping right in order to determine if 
the library might want to acquire a particular digital workwould 
also violate the statute.119  The fair use doctrine is not a defense to 
the act of circumvention.120  Thus, as Nimmer states in his recent 
article, section 1201 produces a most curious state of affairs.  It 
safeguards various rights to users but simultaneously bars third 
parties from assisting them to take advantage of those safeguarded 
rights.121 
 
 116 The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and The World 
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Hearings on 
H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law, The American University, representing the 
Digital Future Coalition, noting that the Digital Future Coalition represents 43 national 
organizations collectively committed to the appropriate application of intellectual property 
laws in the emerging networked digital information environment.) [hereinafter Jaszi 
Statement]. 
 117 Samuelson, supra note 83, at 534. 
 118 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 143 (prohibiting devices which facilitate access to 
copyrighted works, in addition to prohibiting authorized uses of such works, § 1201 
arguably limits the general publics ability to make fair use of copyrighted works). 
 119 See id. 
 120 See SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4. 
 121 See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 733. 
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It is well settled that access, in the digital environment, is a 
necessary prerequisite to use.122  Thus, it follows that if one cannot 
invoke fair use while attempting to access a work in order to use it 
for legitimate purposes, then the defense of fair use is pre-empted.123  
Within this new framework, the copyright owner now exercises 
control over the use, not just the reproduction, distribution, or 
performance of the copyrighted work.124  In this way the DMCA 
upsets the traditional balance afforded by the 1976 Copyright Act.125  
The new balance, it is argued, tilts decidedly toward the desires of 
the content providers (i.e., copyright owners) to the detriment of the 
publics ability to access works,126 and also to the detriment of the 
information technology sector in advancing new technological 
innovations.127  The copyright industries, Pamela Samuelson 
concludes, seem to believe they are so important to America that 
they should be allowed to control every facet of what Americans do 
with digital information.128 
Legislators grappled with this apparent imbalance while the 
DMCA was still working its way through various committees.129  
While the bill was under review in the Commerce Committee, 
Representative Bliley noted that copyright law is not just about 
protecting information.  Its just as much about affording reasonable 
access to it as a means of keeping our democracy healthy.130  The 
Commerce Committee voiced its concern about the proposed legal 
framework and its potential to create a pay-per-use society.131  [I]t 
would be ironic, as the consumers Union stated in a letter to the 
Commerce Committee, if the great popularization of access to 
 
 122 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 143 (because access is a prerequisite to use, by 
controlling the former, the copyright owner may well end up preventing or conditioning the 
latter.). 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See generally id. 
 126 See Samuelson, supra note 83, at 533-34. 
 127 See id. 
 128 Id. at 534. 
 129 See, e.g., supra notes 91, 114, 116. 
 130 144 CONG. REC. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley), as quoted 
in Samuelson, supra note 83, at 542-43. 
 131 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998). 
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information, which is the promise of the electronic age, will be short-
changed by legislation that purports to promote this promise, but in 
reality puts a monopoly stranglehold on information.132 
In contrast to the analog world, if a work is distributed digitally 
and a physical copy does not exist, then it is possible to envision a 
scenario where in order to even browse a particular work, one would 
need to pay for each such use.133  Such a scenario could restrict the 
free flow of information and tip the balance in favor of content 
providers.134  To avoid such an outcome, the Commerce Committee 
included various measures designed to strike a suitable balance 
between the goals of advancing electronic commerce and still 
protecting intellectual property in a digital setting.135  Among these 
measures, the congressional press release on the issue cited the 
inclusion of strong fair use provisions, such as the shopping right for 
educational and other similarly situated institutions, and the 
provisions calling for administrative review of those adversely 
affected users.136 
As Nimmer notes, however, it is unclear whether § 1201 
effectively protects fair use and, for that matter, whether § 1201 
successfully prevents the risk of a pay-per-use world.137  Nimmer 
illustrates the inadequacy of the user exemption with the following 
example: 
Sally is to be hired to aid someone [Harry, who lacks the 
technical expertise to circumvent himself] who has every 
right under section 1201 to circumvent the technological 
protections in order to obtain access.  It would seem, 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Jennifer Burke Sylva, Digital Delivery & Distribution of Music & Other Media: 
Recent Trends in Copyright Law; Relevant Technologies; and Emerging Business Models, 
20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 217, 228-29 (2000) (discussing risk that only people who pay 
will benefit from creative works if access is limited by means of technological gates and 
digital envelopes.). 
 134 See id. 
 135 See Congressional Press Release, Tom Bliley, House Approves Commerce 
Committee Bill Protecting Consumer (Aug. 4, 1998). 
 136 See id. 
 137 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 726. 
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therefore, that her conduct should not only be exempt 
under the statute, but that it should be positively 
applaudedfor it is necessary to vindicate the statutes 
policies, with respect to all but the most technically 
sophisticated users of copyrighted materials.  Nonetheless, 
the statute as drafted bars Sally from aiding Harry because 
the user exemption applies solely to the basic provision 
and not to the coordinate trafficking ban.138 
Therefore, though Sally would only be circumventing in 
order to aid Harry, an individual who will make a 
legitimate fair use of the work, she would still be 
culpable under the DMCA.139  Technically, by helping 
Harry, Sally is providing her services, which arguably: 
(1) are primarily designed for the purpose of 
circumventing; or, (2) have only limited commercial 
significance, purpose, or use other than to circumvent a 
technological measure; or (3) are marketed by or in 
concert with that person with his or her knowledge for use 
in circumventing a technological measure.140  Short of 
developing the technical expertise on his own, Harry 
requires the services of another to gain access; 
nevertheless, these services are defined in the statute as 
trafficking.141  Because the user exemption only applies to 
the basic provision and not the ban on trafficking, Harry 
may not legally gain access.142  As a result, the reach of 
the trafficking ban is unjustifiably broad; Congress should 
have reconciled the trafficking ban with the exemptions 
that it placed on the basic provision.143 
 
 138 Id. at 735-36. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 736. 
 141 Id. at 735-37. 
 142 Nimmer, supra note 23, at 735-37. 
 143 Id. at 737. 
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B.  Section 1201: A Necessary Enhancement of Copyright Protection 
for the Digital Age 
1.  Is Section 1201 Too Broad? 
In enacting the DMCA, Congress was well aware that it had to 
strike a balance between fair use and the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA controlling access to copyrighted works.144  
In the end, the prevalent view in Congress reflected that of the White 
Paper, asserting that stronger protection was necessary in order for 
copyright holders to be able to exploit their works digitally.145  
Without these stronger protections, the risk of piracy would 
overshadow the benefits of entering the digital market for copyright 
owners.146 
The digital age, and the new threat of piracy which accompanies 
it,147 demands a new legal framework in order to preserve the 
traditional rights of copyright owners.148  Far from expanding the 
monopoly of exclusive rights held by content owners, the DMCA 
ensures only that copyright owners retain their preexisting rights.149  
The digital world is so different from the analog world that imposing 
meaningful protection requires a readjusting of the copyright 
balance.150  Indeed, the new digital environment requires that 
[m]eaningful protection for copyrighted works . . . proceeds [sic] on 
two fronts: the property rights themselves, supplemented by legal 
assurances that those rights can be technologically safeguarded.151  
The Copyright Office has refuted the idea that § 1201 should cover 
 
 144 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
 146 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (discussing the need for new legislation [d]ue to 
the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually 
instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the 
Internet without reasonable assurances that they will be protected against massive piracy.). 
 147 See supra notes 8, 146 and accompanying text. 
 148 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). 
 149 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205. 
 150 See Peters Statement, supra note 79 (discussing the inadequacy of previous legal 
protection in dealing with new technologies). 
 151 Id. 
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only bad acts, i.e., infringement, as opposed to extending it to the 
marketing and/or distribution of devices capable of circumvention.152  
Such an interpretation has been rejected by the Copyright Office as 
inadequate because of the difficulty involved in discovering and 
obtaining meaningful relief from individuals who engage in acts of 
circumvention.153  Therefore, a more expansive prohibition that 
reaches the individuals providing the means for circumvention is 
necessary to make the protection adequate and effective.154  The 
Register of Copyrights has further noted that the conduct of 
commercial suppliers is what actually enables and ultimately results 
in large-scale circumvention.155 
Certain critics, such as the Digital Future Coalition, suggest that § 
1201 be amended to make the standard for a violation conjunctive, as 
opposed to disjunctive.156  According to this view, the three possible 
ways in which one could violate § 1201 should be strung together so 
that one must do all three: (1) the device must have been primarily 
designed or produced to circumvent; and (2) the device must have 
only a limited commercially significant purpose; and (3) the device 
must be marketed for use in circumventingin order to violate the 
statute.157  However, as discussed below, requiring the violation of 
all three categories would greatly reduce the effectiveness of § 1201 
as it now stands.158 
The alleged broadness of § 1201 is a necessary reaction to the 
manner in which circumvention devices may end up on the market.  
As Hillary Rosen from the Recording Industry Association of 
America (hereinafter RIAA) explained during her statement before 
the House Commerce Committee, such a construct of § 1201 
assumes a singular chain of command in the way products are 
placed in the marketplace.159  However, since there is no single 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See Peters Statement, supra note 79 (discussing the inadequacy of previous legal 
protection in dealing with new technologies). 
 156 See Jaszi Statement, supra note 116. 
 157 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
 158 See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text. 
 159 Rosen Statement, supra note 91. 
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chain of command, § 1201 had to be drafted as a disjunctive test to 
have the desired effect on the different players along the distribution 
chain.160  The first proscribed categorythat of primarily designing 
a circumvention devicespeaks to the manufacturers of the 
technology.161  The second proscribed categorybanning devices 
that have only a limited commercially significant purpose other than 
circumventionis a catch-all intended to weed out otherwise useless 
products that end up causing harm.162  The third, and final, 
proscribed categorythat of marketing a circumvention product
speaks to the retailers and distributors.163  If the statute required that 
all three elements be combined, the standard would be effectively 
impossible to meet and [would be] a road map for pirates.164 
The purpose of these proscriptions is to keep circumvention 
devices off the market.165  As Jane Ginsburg noted in a recent article: 
[b]y outlawing the general distribution of post-access circumvention 
devices, Congress has . . . adjusted the technological status quo in 
favor of copyright owners, and, at least for now, set the copyright 
balance against unauthorized convenience copying.166  In the 
analog world, copyrighted works were not amenable to effective 
copy protection and thus convenience copying was tolerated to 
some extent.167  In the digital world, however, the dangers of such 
convenience copying are immeasurably direr for the copyright 
owners,168 thus warranting legal protection for the actual 
technological protection given to digital copyrighted works.169 
Indeed, if in the past low technology imposed a tolerance for 
widespread copying, this state of affairs should not be confused with 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id.; 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2)(A). 
 162 Rosen Statement, supra note 91. 
 163 Id.; 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2)(C). 
 164 Rosen Statement, supra note 91. 
 165 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 144. 
 166 Id. at 155. 
 167 Id. at 154. 
 168 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why piracy is a much 
greater threat in the digital era). 
 169 See id. 
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a legal right to engage in widespread convenience copying.170  
Accordingly, as § 1201(a)(2) sets forth, devices which enable such 
convenience copying must effectively be kept off the market.171  In 
this way, the proscriptions of § 1201(a) are not overly broad, but in 
fact are well tailored to respond to the new threats posed by the 
digital environment. 
2.  Section 1201 Does Not Disturb Fair Use 
Proponents of the DMCA have rebutted the claim that § 1201 does 
not preserve the defense of fair use.172  The Copyright Office clearly 
set out in its summary of the new legislation that the distinction 
between the prohibitions against access and the prohibitions against 
infringement were specifically adopted to preserve fair use.173  
Therefore, an individual cannot cry fair use to escape liability and 
thus emasculate the anti-circumvention provisions when he or she 
has unlawfully obtained access; fair use applies only with lawful 
access.174  Supporters of the DMCA provisions argue that lawful 
access has always been a prerequisite to fair use, thus the anti-
circumvention provisions do not truly constitute a change in the 
manner in which fair use is invoked.175 
Furthermore, proponents of § 1201 assert that the balance has not 
shifted since it has long been accepted in U.S. law that the copyright 
owner has the right to control access to his work, and may choose not 
to make it available to others or to do so on only set terms.176  This 
principle is illustrated by a myriad of real-life examples, including 
situations in which a copyright owner may choose to never publish a 
work, or when a movie theater or museum charges admission and 
bans the recording (be they audio, video, or photographic recordings) 
 
 170 Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 154. 
 171 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
 172 See, e.g., Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 173 SUMMARY, supra note 15, at 4. 
 174 See id.; see also Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 175 Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 176 Id. 
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of the works presented.177  Thus the copyright owner traditionally 
has both controlled and conditioned the access of copyrighted works 
afforded to the public, with users generally paying for access.178  The 
Administrations White Paper noted that the fair use doctrine does 
not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized 
access or use of a work.179  If this were the case, then even 
passwords for access to computer databases would be considered 
illegal.180 
The anti-circumvention provisions embodied in § 1201 simply 
continue this practice, and have been analogized to a law against 
breaking and entering: Under existing law, it is not permissible to 
break into a locked room in order to make fair use of a manuscript 
kept inside.181  Similarly, one cannot circumvent technological 
protections without authorization in order to make a fair use of a 
digital work.182 
Not only does § 1201 preserve fair use, but its proponents contend 
that the standard built into § 1201namely, that of proscribing 
circumvention devices which have only a limited commercially 
significant purpose other than to circumventin fact builds upon the 
substantial non-infringing standard set forth in Sony.183  While the 
Sony standard in itself is ineffective in addressing the problem of 
circumvention,184 the [standard from section 1201] makes the 
[Sony] standard more meaningful. 185  The Register of Copyrights 
further claims that that § 1201 is helpful because it refers: 
 
 177 See White Paper, supra note 27, at 762-63. 
 178 See Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 179 White Paper, supra note 27, at 762-63. 
 180 Id. at 763. 
 181 Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. ([m]ost devices for circumventing technological measures, even those 
designed or entirely used for infringing purposes, will be capable of substantial non-
infringing uses since they could potentially be employed in the course of a fair use, or in the 
use of a public domain work.  It is therefore not surprising that the Sony standard, in 
practice, has been ineffective in addressing the circumvention problem.). 
 185 Id. 
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to the extent to which the product is actually used for 
legitimate purposes, rather than its capability to be used 
for such purposes.  At the same time, it is consistent with 
Sony in that it does not prohibit products with a 
substantial non-circumventing use, only those with merely 
limited commercially significant non-circumventing 
use.186 
Thus, in contrast to the arguments set forth by the DMCAs 
critics,187 § 1201 preserves the availability of multi-purpose 
consumer electronic devices so long as such products are actually 
used for, and are not merely capable of, substantial non-
circumventing use.188 
C.  Case Study: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were put to the 
test in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.189  In the early 
1990s, the major film studios explored the possibility of releasing 
films to the home market in the form of digital versatile disks 
(hereinafter DVD).190  Noting the increased threat of piracy that 
accompanied the release of films in a digital format, the major film 
studios adopted an encryption system (known as CSS, a content-
scrambling system) to protect each DVD.191  In turn, the motion 
picture studios licensed the technology necessary to decrypt the 
DVD files to consumer electronic manufacturers.192     The end result  
 
 186 Id. (emphasis added). 
 187 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
 189 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 190 Id. at 309. 
 191 Id. at 309-10. 
 192 Id. at 310. 
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was that DVDs could be played, but not copied, on licensed players 
and computer drives.193 
In September 1999, a Norwegian teenager by the name of Jon 
Johansen, with the help of two friends, reverse engineered194 a 
licensed DVD player and unlocked the key to the CSS encryption 
algorithm.195  With this new information, the teenagers created 
DeCSS, a program enabling non-compliant computers to both play 
and copy DVD files to the computers hard drive.196  Johansen 
posted the DeCSS program on the web, and it quickly became 
available on a variety of websites.197 
In January 2000, the Motion Picture Association of America 
(hereinafter MPAA) brought suit against a website known as 
2600.com, which both posted the DeCSS program on its site and 
provided links to other websites posting the program.198  In February 
of 2000, the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary 
injunction against the defendants and ordered them to remove the 
DeCSS posting from their website.199  The defendants complied, but 
still supported links to other websites with DeCSS.200  The MPAA 
promptly filed suit against the defendants under the DMCA, alleging 
that by providing links to websites with DeCSS, the defendants were 
violating § 1201(a)(2) by making available certain technologies 
developed or advertised to defeat technological protections against 
unauthorized access to a [copyrighted] work, in violation of § 
1201(a)(2) (banning trafficking).201      In other words, the defendants 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (defining reverse engineering as analyzing elements in order 
to achieve interoperability with other programs.). 
 195 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 312. 
 199 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(granting plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction against defendants posting of the 
DeCSS program on their website). 
 200 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
 201 Id. at 316. 
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were continuing to do indirectly what they were enjoined from doing 
under the injunction.202 
Judge Kaplan cited as the inescapable facts of the case the 
following: (1) CSS is a technological means that effectively 
controls access to plaintiffs copyrighted works, (2) the one and only 
function of DeCSS is to circumvent CSS, and (3) defendants offered 
and provided DeCSS by posting it on their web site.203  Moreover, 
[w]hether defendants [posted DeCSS] in order to infringe, or to 
permit or encourage others to infringe, copyrighted works in 
violation of other provisions of the Copyright Act simply does not 
matter for the purposes of section 1201(a)(2).204 
In response to the charges from the MPAA, the defendants raised 
the affirmative defense of fair use, arguing that it is improper to 
construe § 1201 in a manner which would impede making a fair use 
of plaintiffs copyrighted works, i.e., DVDs.205  Accordingly, the 
defendants asserted that § 1201 did not apply to their activities, 
which simply enabled users of DeCSS to make fair uses of plaintiffs 
works.206  In substance, the defendants contended, the anti-
trafficking provision leaves those who lack sufficient technical 
expertise to circumvent CSS themselves without the means of 
acquiring circumvention technology that they need to make fair use 
of the content of plaintiffs copyrighted DVDs.207  In addition, 
defendants claimed that because DeCSS may be used for the purpose 
of gaining access to copyrighted works in order to make a fair use, 
DeCSS is capable of a substantial non-infringing use208 and is thus 
permissible under the holding in Sony.209 
Judge Kaplan, in ruling on the issue, stated that [a] given device 
or piece of technology might have a substantial non-infringing use, 
 
 202 See id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23. 
 206 Id. at 322. 
 207 Id. at 336. 
 208 Id. at 323 (quoting RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 
WL 127311, *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (citation omitted)). 
 209 See supra text accompanying notes 104-06 (discussing holding of Sony). 
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and hence be immune from attack under Sonys construction of the 
Copyright Actbut nonetheless still be subject to suppression under 
section 1201 . . . Congress explicitly noted that section 1201 does not 
incorporate Sony.210  Moreover, as Judge Kaplan observed, fair use 
is not a defense to a § 1201(a)(2) violation since the defendants are 
not being sued for copyright infringement.211 
Furthermore, Judge Kaplan reasoned, those wishing to make a fair 
use of plaintiffs DVDs are not precluded from doing so.212  As he 
explained, fair use of a motion picture necessarily implicates one of 
the following three uses: (1) quoting words from the script; (2) 
listening to the soundtrack; and (3) viewing of the actual images.213  
He concluded that while [a]ll three of these types of uses now are 
affected by the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA, they are 
affected only to a trivial degree.214  First, all films available on 
DVD are also available on videotape.215  Second, even assuming that 
films will one day only be available digitally, Judge Kaplan asserted 
the impact on lawful use would still be limited since [c]ompliant 
DVD players permit one to view or listen to a DVD movie without 
circumventing CSS in any prohibited sense.  The technology 
permitting manufacture of compliant DVD players is available to 
anyone on a royalty-free basis and at a modest cost.216 
As Judge Kaplan noted, the anti-circumvention provisions could 
significantly impact technology that copies portions of a DVD, since 
the design of compliant DVD players prevents copying.217      It is the  
 
 210 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24 (citations omitted). 
 211 See id. at 322 (noting that defendants are sued for offering and providing technology 
designed to circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works and 
otherwise violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act.  If Congress had meant the fair use 
defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so.). 
 212 See id. at 322-23. 
 213 See id. at 337. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 337. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
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rights of these individuals upon whom the defendants most heavily 
rely.218  However, there is no evidence that the rights of such third 
parties are implicated in the case at hand.219 
Stating that in an age in which the excitement of ready access to 
untold quantities of information has blurred in some minds the fact 
that taking what is not yours and not freely offered to you is 
stealing,220 the court held that the DMCA  weighed in on the side of 
the MPAA and accordingly, entitled the film studios to injunctive 
and declaratory relief.221 
III. DMCA AS A PROPER RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT REALITY 
A.  Analysis of Reimerdes 
Many in the legal community anticipated the decision in 
Reimerdes since it represented one of the first cases in which a 
federal court would apply the DMCA.222  Reimerdes established 
important legal precedent and reframed the debate over fair use.223 
In their Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, defendants criticized 
Judge Kaplans interpretation of the DMCA, arguing that such a 
construction would grant copyright owners the power to abolish the 
fair use of digital works by furnishing them with control over all 
physical means to display or copy those works.224  Defendants 
 
 218 See id. at 338. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 345. 
 221 Id. at 346 (In our society . . . clashes of competing interests like this are resolved by 
Congress.  For now, at least, Congress has resolved this clash in the DMCA and in 
plaintiffs favor.). 
 222 See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Tough Court Fight Expected Over DVD Code, N.Y. TIMES 
CYBER LAW JOURNAL, (Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
library/tech/00/02/cyber/cyberlaw/11law.html ([Reimerdes] could well prove to be more 
legally significant because it represents one of the first cases in which a federal court will 
attempt to interpret the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.). 
 223 See supra notes 189-93, 195-98, 200-21 and accompanying text. 
 224 See Respondents Post-Trial Memorandum of Law, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-277). 
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further protested that while DeCSS allows forms of fair uses, such as 
brief quoting, excerpting, scientific study, or academic archiving, 
plaintiffs authorized DVD players deliberately do not permit such 
uses.225  The fact that they were not being sued for infringement 
should not, according to defendants, allow the court to ignore the 
radical effect the DMCA has on the potential fair uses of DeCSS.226 
However, the fact that defendants are not being sued for 
infringement, but rather for providing an anti-circumvention device, 
was precisely the purpose behind the enactment of the DMCA, and 
specifically § 1201(a)(2).227  Section 1201(a)(2) creates a new right 
for copyright owners by providing them with the right to guard the 
technological system which protects copyrighted content in a digital 
format.228  As legislative history makes abundantly clear, fair use is 
not a defense to a § 1201(a)(2) violation.229  According to Congress, 
this new right was an appropriate response to the changing digital 
environment.230  The fact that § 1201 stands as a distinct violation 
from infringement is crucial.231  Otherwise: 
the § 1201 anti-trafficking provisions would be 
meaningless, because a plaintiff would have to wait until 
copyright infringement has occurred to bring an action, 
and infringement was already unlawful before the DMCA 
was enacted.     Congress could not have intended a statute  
 
 225 See id. 
 226 See id. 
 227 See id. 
 228 Trial Transcript at 4, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-0277) [hereinafter Trial Transcript] (the DMCA created . . . a 
new right that a copyright owner would have if he had to protect the system, a technology 
which would protect his copyrighted material.  He got the right to that safety device and the 
right not to have it circumvented as a matter of federal law.  So this is like a guard or a moat 
surrounding the house, the protected material.). 
 229 See Peters Statement, supra note 79. 
 230 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). 
 231 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 839-40 (2001). 
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enacted after such extensive consideration to be 
interpreted as mere surplusage [sic] to an already existing 
right to sue for copyright infringement.232 
Even assuming fair use was an applicable defense, the defendants 
in Reimerdes are far from eligible for the exception.  As Mary Beth 
Peters, the Register of Copyright, stated in her statement before the 
House Judiciary Committee, the DMCA builds upon the meaning of 
Sony, the seminal case on fair use, by referring to the extent to which 
the product (in this case DeCSS) is actually used for lawful purposes, 
as opposed to its capability to be used for lawful purposes.233  Thus, 
while defendants argue that DeCSS permits certain forms of fair use, 
its mere potential to be used for legitimate purposes does not satisfy 
the necessary standard.234 
There is no evidence that DeCSS has actually been used for such 
legitimate purposes.  However, it was clear from defendants website 
that the hyperlinks to other sites with postings of DeCSS were, at the 
very least, marketed with the knowledge they could be used to 
circumvent technological measures that control access to a protected 
work.235  While Jon Johansen may have developed DeCSS with the 
legitimate intent of enabling non-compliant computers to play 
DVDs, the defendants in Reimerdes plainly did not market the 
device as such.236  Likewise, the DMCA does not allow them to hide 
behind the alleged legitimate intent of the manufacturer in defense.237  
Instead, Reimerdes illustrates why the anti-circumvention provisions 
require disjunctive, as opposed to conjunctive, language to serve 
 
 232 Appellants Post-Trial Brief at 6, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 111 F. Supp. 
2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-277). 
 233 Peters Statement, supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 234 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 152 (arguing that allowing a device to be exculpated 
simply because it is capable of being put to fair use . . . [would] as a practical matter [allow] 
the fair use tail [to] again wag the copyright infringement dog.). 
 235 See Trial Transcript, supra note 228, at 13 (noting that the defendants website 
stated, Yes, you can trade DVD movie files over the Internet and Notice the DVD Copy 
Control Association are cocksuckers.). 
 236 Id. 
 237 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (omitting intent as a prerequisite to determining if an 
anti-circumvention measure is in violation of the DMCA). 
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their purpose.238  If a violation of § 1201 required that the 
circumventing device be primarily designed to circumvent and 
possess only a limited commercially significant purpose other than 
circumvention and be marketed as a circumvention device, then § 
1201 would be riddled with ways by which distributors could avoid 
liability.  Namely, it would enable one to hide behind what the 
device was designed to do, a standard bearing no relationship to how 
a device will ultimately be marketed and, most importantly, put to 
use.  In Reimerdes, the DMCA served its purpose by holding the 
defendants accountable for marketing DeCSS as a circumvention 
product which would allow individuals to bypass the encryption 
system protecting DVDs.239 
B.  Analysis of DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions: Is Section 
1201 Too Broad? 
The DMCA allows copyright owners to control digital 
distribution.240  The argument that the DMCA thereby created a new 
right for copyright owners, a right to control access to copyrighted 
works, is not accurate.  While it is true that the DMCA prohibits both 
the infringement of a copyrighted work and the circumvention of a 
technological measure in order to gain unauthorized access to the 
work, this right to control access is not a new one.241  As discussed 
earlier, the copyright holder traditionally has controlled and 
conditioned access to their works by charging the public for such 
access (for example, charging admission to a movie or an art 
exhibit).242  In this way, the copyright owner has always had the 
right to control the manner in which members of the public 
apprehend the work.243 
 
 238 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 239 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18. 
 240 See 17 U.S.C §§ 1201-1205. 
 241 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
 242 See supra note 177-78 and accompanying text. 
 243 Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of 
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY 
(Hugh Hansen ed., 2000). 
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Scholars such as Jane C. Ginsburg argue that this access differs 
from the conception of reproduction or communication rights to the 
extent that . . . the user may purchase a digital copy such as a CD 
ROM, but the user may not open the work to apprehend (listen to 
or view) its contents, unless the user acquires the key to the 
work.244  Professor Ginsburg argues that this differs from 
conventional rights since traditionally, once a particular copy was 
sold, the copyright law did not constrain the purchasers further 
disposition of that copy.245  However, the relevance of this fact may 
have more to do with the limitations inherent in analog works as 
opposed to digital works.246  The differences between the two 
formats mandate a re-examination of what rights are required to 
maintain a copyright balance.247  Furthermore, even some critics who 
claim that the DMCA is overbroad concede that a so-called access 
right is necessary to maintain any meaningful exclusive copyright 
rights in the digital era.248 
Pamela Samuelson argues that § 1201 should have been drafted 
more narrowly, punishing only those attempting to circumvent 
protections for the purposes of copyright infringement, and not those 
circumventing to gain access (as barred by the ban on trafficking).249  
However, § 1201 was not designed just to punish individual bad acts, 
as the Copyright Act already does, but had the larger goal of keeping 
circumvention devices off the market.250  Because the language is 
disjunctive, § 1201 also bans devices that are designed, primarily 
used, or marketed for use in circumventing a technological measure 
that controls access.251  The DMCA was developed to respond to the 
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 245 Id. 
 246 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
 247 Ginsburg, supra note 243, at 8 ([E]ven if an access right does not precisely 
correspond to either of the traditional copyright rights of reproduction or public 
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 250 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. 
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unprecedented characteristics of the digital environment
characteristics which demonstrate that once a circumvention device 
becomes available on the market, it may be too late to control 
widespread copyright infringement.252  Unlike in the analog world, 
digital copying can become widespread virtually overnight, acquiring 
an instant global audience.253  These unique risks are precisely why 
Congress did not make it necessary to prove infringement in order to 
stop a circumvention device from becoming available to the 
public.254 
Additionally, opponents of the anti-circumvention provisions 
argue that by barring anyone from designing or marketing a device 
that can circumvent an access control measure, and further, not 
allowing fair use as a defense to a violation of this ban on trafficking, 
§ 1201 effectively extinguishes fair use.255  According to these 
critics, if one strictly followed the language of § 1201, it would be 
impossible for one who did not possess the technical expertise to 
circumvent to legally gain the access necessary to make a fair use of 
the work.256 
This argument is only persuasive in a futuristic world that 
produces exclusively digital copies, since only digital works are 
protected by a technological measure.  Thus, the term access, as 
used in § 1201, is only a prerequisite to use to the extent that a non-
digital alternative does not exist.  While it is certainly an interesting 
academic question, it is unsupportable as an underlying premise by 
which to advocate the emasculation of § 1201. 
Furthermore, the ban on trafficking bars individuals only from 
gaining unauthorized access.257  If fair use could be introduced as a 
defense against the ban on trafficking, then individuals would be able 
to use it as a defense to unlawfully obtaining access.  However, even 
 
 252 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
 253 See Lehman Statement, supra note 8. 
 254 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
 255 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
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 257 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
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the traditional notion of fair use has never allowed unauthorized 
access.258  Lawful access has always been a prerequisite to fair 
use.259 
CONCLUSION 
Ironically, both the proponents and the critics of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA rely on the same policy 
arguments to advance their positionsthat  the ultimate goal should 
be to allow the public to benefit from the digital dissemination of 
copyrighted works.260 
Proponents of the DMCA claim that without enacting proper 
safeguards for copyright owners, there would be no incentive for 
them to risk the increased threats of piracy existing in the digital 
world by distributing works digitally.261  Likewise, critics of the 
DMCA argue that because § 1201 flatly prohibits circumvention 
devices, the public will not have the necessary access to digital 
works in order to make fair use of such works.262  Therefore, in a 
future where copyrighted works may be available exclusively in 
digital format, the public will benefit less from copyrighted works 
because access is a prerequisite to fair use, and § 1201 bars access. 
However, the latter argument relies entirely on unsupported 
assumptions about the future, primarily, that a time will come when 
works are exclusively available in digitally encrypted format.263  The 
hypothetical scenarios surrounding such a world neglect todays 
realities.  Today, as well as in the foreseeable future, it is the 
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copyright owner who is imperiled, not the individual attempting to 
make a fair use.  Without proper protections there will be no digital 
works of which to make a fair use.  In this reality, the law must 
reinforce the copyright owners efforts to prevent unauthorized (and 
unmonitored) copying,264 as opposed to leaving technology and the 
market to what has been dubbed an encryption arms race.265 
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